



Anonymous Tips Alleging Drunk Driving:  Why “One Free 
Swerve” Is One Too Many  
I. Introduction 
Drunk driving has been referred to as many things, including selfish, 
stupid, and arrogant.1  The very mention of the act no doubt incites many 
people.  Mothers Against Drunk Driving, a non-profit organization, was 
even founded with the sole mission of ending drunk driving in America.2  
This organization claims that one in three people in the United States will 
be involved in an alcohol-related traffic accident in their lifetime.3  It is 
probably a safe assumption that the majority of people who read this article 
have been affected in some way by drunk driving, whether by being 
personally involved in an accident with a drunk driver, a loved one being 
involved in the same, or even having friends who routinely drive while over 
the legal limit. 
Drunk driving not only poses unique dangers, but also unique legal 
issues.  This is evidenced by the current split in authority regarding whether 
an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is sufficient constitutionally to 
justify an investigative traffic stop without prior independent police 
corroboration of the tip’s allegations.  The majority of courts hold that a 
responding officer is justified in conducting an investigative stop of the 
driver alleged to be drunk in the anonymous tip without first independently 
corroborating the tip’s allegation of illegality.4  The minority of courts, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Mayor Vows to Continue to Press D.W.I. Battle, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2002, at B6; Jim, Comment to 4 Time DUI Sentence: Woman Gets Jail 
Time, WOWT CHANNEL 6 (Jan. 26, 2011, 6:59PM), http://www.wowt.com/ 
home/headlines/4_Time_DUI_Sentence_114581064.html?storySection=comments; Monica 
Dean, Police: Drunk Driving ‘Is Just Stupid’, NBC SAN DIEGO, Aug. 4, 2010, http://www. 
nbcsandiego.com/news/local-beat/Police-Drunk-Driving-Is-Just-Stupid-99 954129.html. 
 2. See History of the Mission Statement, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, 
http://www.madd.org/about-us/mission (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 3. Statistics, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org/statistics/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., THE TRAFFIC STOP AND YOU: IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CITIZENS 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 2001)). 
 4. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 
810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 
P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); State v. Crawford, 
67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); State v. Scholl, 684 
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however, hold that an investigative traffic stop based solely upon an 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is an unconstitutional seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5 
Legislatures6 and courts alike have taken an overt stance against drunk 
driving, and it shows in the statistics.  In 2009, close to 11,000 fatalities in 
the United States were caused by alcohol-impaired driving.7  This number 
is less than half of what it was in the early 1980s.8  Nevertheless, there is 
still more that can be done to continue to reduce the number of lives lost 
because of drunk driving.  In dissent from the denial of certiorari of a recent 
petition to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
The effect of the [minority position] will be to grant drunk 
drivers “one free swerve” before they can legally be pulled over 
by police.  It will be difficult for an officer to explain to the 
family of a motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a 
tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they were 
powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check.9 
                                                                                                                 
N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); State v. Rutzinski, 623 
N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001). 
 5. See State v. Sparen, No. CR00258199S, 2001 WL 206078 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001); 
Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Miller, 510 
N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994); Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo. 
1999). 
 6. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (dealing with 
a state law establishing sobriety checkpoints designed to mete out and remove drunk drivers 
from public roads); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 (1983) (dealing with a state 
implied consent law providing for the summary suspension of a person’s driver’s license 
upon arrest for drunk driving if the person refuses to submit to a blood alcohol test); see also 
Administrative License Revocation, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www. 
madd.org/laws/administrative-license-revocation.html (listing the states that have implied 
consent laws that provide for the summary suspension of driver’s licenses upon arrest for 
drunk driving suspicion) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Sobriety Checkpoints, MOTHERS 
AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org/laws/sobriety-checkpoints.html (listing the 
states that have sobriety checkpoint laws) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012). 
 7. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811-
385 Traffic Safety Facts, 1 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ncsa/ 
pdf/2010/811385.pdf. 
 8. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Traffic Safety 
Facts 1993: Alcohol, 1 (1993), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/93 
Alcohol.pdf. 
 9. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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The majority position also has its problems.  The Fourth Amendment is a 
powerful protector of individual privacy from arbitrary invasion,10 and the 
majority of courts advocate crafting a blanket exception to this important 
individual right.  This comment examines both sides of this thus far 
unresolved issue. In particular, it argues that while Fourth Amendment 
privacy is important and should be treated as such, in the majority of cases, 
the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is reliable enough to render an 
investigative stop based solely on that tip reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  This is because of several key factors typically present in the 
drunk driving situation that make the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving 
sufficiently reliable to arouse reasonable suspicion on the part of 
responding officers.  
Part II of this comment examines the history of the Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure clause, including relevant Supreme Court cases.  In 
addition, it gives a brief synopsis of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and 
Oklahoma court decisions regarding anonymous tips.  Part III examines the 
rationale behind both majority and minority holdings in the split, including 
a look at Oklahoma’s position.  Part IV argues that although the majority 
position’s reasoning is flawed, the bulk of investigative stops based solely 
upon anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Part V concludes. 
II. History of the Fourth Amendment  
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.11 
Dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, Justice Jackson stated that the 
rights given in this amendment should be categorized as indispensable 
freedoms.12  This is because “[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the 
first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary 
                                                                                                                 
 10. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 12. 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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government.”13  Justice Jackson went further to say that a people’s dignity, 
personality, and self-reliance can cease to exist when they are subjected to 
unchecked police power in the form of search and seizure.14  Thus, the 
Fourth Amendment protects against government officials arbitrarily 
intruding upon individual privacy and security.15  As with several other 
constitutional provisions, it applies to the States by way of incorporation 
into the Fourteenth Amendment.16   
Historically, in ruling on Fourth Amendment cases where criminal 
activity was not observed firsthand, the Court has typically required the 
police to obtain judicial assent through the warrant procedure prior to 
searching or seizing.17  This procedure requires a showing of probable 
cause, where an impartial decision maker determines whether there is a 
reasonable belief that what is sought will be found in a particular place.18  
The limited exceptions to complying with this warrant requirement include 
hot pursuit19 and searches incidental to lawful arrests20—including searches 
of things under the immediate control of the person arrested21—and, in 
certain instances, searches of the place where the person is arrested.22  
Another exception to the warrant requirement is that law enforcement can 
make a brief investigative stop of an automobile if the officer has probable 
cause to believe searching the vehicle will provide evidence of a crime.23  
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 180-81; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. 
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred . . . than the right 
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”)). 
 15. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528. 
 16. Id. (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963)). 
 17. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379 
U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 477, 479, 480-81 (1963); 
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-
98, 500 (1958). 
 18. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 191 (2010). 
 19. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (“The Fourth 
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do 
so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”). 
 20. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (citing Agnello v. United States, 
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1946); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)). 
 21. Preston, 376 U.S. at 367 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925)). 
 22. Id. (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950)); Marron v. 
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30. 
 23. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; 
United States v. Williams, 827 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Or. 1993). 
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Although an investigative traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment,24 an exception was carved out due to a combination of 
the impracticalities of obtaining a warrant to search a mobile vehicle—
something that can disappear before a warrant can be attained and search 
lawfully done—and the fact that there is a decreased expectation in privacy 
associated with automobiles.25  This was the state of the Supreme Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence until Terry v. Ohio.26   
A. Terry v. Ohio  
In Terry, the Court considered a class of police conduct that it had not 
previously ruled upon in terms of Fourth Amendment constitutionality—
prompt police action based upon surveillance of an officer on patrol.27  In 
ruling on the constitutionality of this branch of police conduct, the Court 
decided that when a police officer reasonably determines that criminal acts 
may be taking place, and where, in making initial inquiries the officer’s 
suspicion is not quelled, he or she may conduct a careful, limited search of 
the suspicious person.28  In other words, reasonable suspicion can lead to a 
constitutionally justifiable investigative stop under the Fourth 
Amendment.29  This was a major divergence from the warrant requirement 
and per se unreasonable search presumption for those searches that were 
not accompanied with a warrant.30  Under Terry, officers can not only 
search without a warrant in certain situations, but also search based upon a 
lower standard than probable cause—the reasonable suspicion standard.31  
These stops are now commonly known as Terry stops.32   
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
 25. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93; 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 192. 
 26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 27. Id. at 20. 
 28. Id. at 30. 
 29. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392 
U.S. at 22). 
 30. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (holding that an 
officer’s acting on an informant’s vague tip would subvert the principle that “[t]he arrest 
warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer 
will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of 
the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause”), and Agnello v. 
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (stating that “[warrantless] searches are held unlawful 
notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause”), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. 
 31. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); United States v. Sokolow, 
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). 
 32. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000); White, 496 U.S. at 328-29; 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
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Following Terry, an issue developed regarding the circumstances where 
a tip from an informant could give rise to a constitutionally justifiable 
police seizure.33  The Court first addressed the issue of whether an 
anonymous tip could give police reasonable suspicion in order to initiate a 
Terry stop in the 1990 case of Alabama v. White. 
B. Alabama v. White 
In Alabama v. White, the issue before the Court was whether an 
anonymous telephone tip, somewhat corroborated by the police, provided a 
degree of reliability sufficient to give reasonable suspicion to justify an 
investigate stop.34  The anonymous tip alleged that a woman would be 
leaving her apartment at a certain time, in a certain car, going to a particular 
place, and that she would be in possession of illegal drugs located inside of 
a brown briefcase.35  Before ultimately ruling that the information contained 
in the anonymous tip was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to 
support reasonable suspicion, the Court looked at previous decisions 
involving tips to the police.36  The Court relied upon, inter alia, Illinois v. 
Gates, where it clarified the standard for evaluating when anonymous tips 
support probable cause.37 
In Gates, the Court abandoned an old approach to determining whether 
probable cause was supported by an anonymous tip,38 and instead adopted a 
totality of the circumstances approach.39  But the Court in Gates was careful 
to note that the critical factors it laid out under the older approach for 
making the probable cause determination—veracity, reliability, and basis of 
knowledge of the informant—were still highly relevant.40  The Court then 
noted that these same factors were applicable in the reasonable suspicion 
context; although, because of its nature, a lesser showing of the factors 
would meet the lower reasonable suspicion standard.41 
                                                                                                                 
 33. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983) (considering whether an 
anonymous letter could give rise to probable cause in order to obtain a warrant); Adams, 407 
U.S. at 147 (sustaining a Terry stop initiated based on a known informant’s tip that was 
given in person). 
 34. 496 U.S. at 326-27. 
 35. Id. at 327. 
 36. Id. at 329-31. 
 37. Id. at 328 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 227). 
 38. Id. at 328. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230). 
 41. Id. at 328-29. 
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Relying on the language and rationale behind Gates, the Court in 
Alabama v. White established the test for whether an anonymous tip granted 
reasonable suspicion to police officers sufficient to justify a Terry stop.42  
Although acknowledging that the Court had previously stated in Gates that 
a bare-bones anonymous tip rarely demonstrates the informant’s veracity or 
basis of knowledge, the Court in White stated that an anonymous caller 
could provide the police with reasonable suspicion when the tip was 
sufficiently corroborated by a law enforcement officer prior to performing 
an investigative stop.43  The Court then proceeded to explain how it could 
be determined whether anonymous tips gave rise to reasonable suspicion.44  
It started out by noting that:  
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion 
can be established with information that is different in quantity 
or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also 
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information 
that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.45 
The Court then explained the totality of the circumstances approach for 
determining whether reasonable suspicion existed.46  The two main factors 
are (1) the quantity of information that is passed on to police, and (2) the 
degree of reliability possessed by the information:47  “[I]f a tip has a 
relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to 
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the 
tip were more reliable.”48  This obviously implies the opposite is just as 
true—if a tip is more reliable, less information is required to establish 
reasonable suspicion.   
It is important to note that the Court found the tip in White to be 
sufficiently corroborated by the police prior to the investigative stop.49  The 
only thing the police corroborated prior to conducting the stop, however, 
seemed to be an instantaneous confirmation of the anonymous tip’s 
                                                                                                                 
 42. See id. at 328-31. 
 43. Id. at 329, 331 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237). 
 44. See id. at 330-31. 
 45. Id. at 330. 
 46. See id. at 330-31. 
 47. Id. at 330. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 331. 
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descriptive information.50  Although acknowledging that White was a close 
case,51 the majority placed great emphasis on the fact that the anonymous 
tip included some predictive element to it.52  The tip at issue gave an 
accurate description of White’s vehicle, an accurate time frame for White’s 
departure from the apartment building, and also provided some 
corroboration for her destination.53  Based upon this, the Court considered it 
reasonable to believe that a tipster’s accurate description of an individual’s 
plans indicates the likelihood that the tipster also has access to trustworthy 
information about that individual’s criminal activities.54   
After Terry and its significant lowering of the standard required of police 
in order to necessitate a seizure, White went a step further by allowing 
searches based on tips that would likely not have been allowed prior to the 
case.  In upholding the investigative stop in White even though the tip “was 
largely uncorroborated, [the Court assured] that in the future virtually all 
tips [would] serve as an adequate justification for intrusive stops by the 
police.”55  This was so because the Court basically stated that law 
enforcement could find reasonable suspicion based on anonymous tips 
merely by corroborating the easily visible content of the tips themselves—
the description of the car driven by the accused, its general direction, etc.   
After the decision was handed down, lower courts began using the 
rationale behind White to uphold Terry stops when police were using 
anonymous tips and only corroborating descriptive details given in these 
tips before initiating a search and seizure.56  Two major exceptions that 
many courts agreed upon were those when an anonymous tipster either 
alleged that a person illegally possessed a firearm57 or that a person was 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Christopher L. Kottke, Alabama v. White: The Constitutionality of Anonymous 
Telephone Tips in Support of “Reasonably Suspicion” and the Narrowing of Fourth 
Amendment Protections, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 620 (1991) (discussing the effect of 
the White decision on Fourth Amendment protections). 
 51. White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
 52. See id. at 331-32. 
 53. Joe Metcalfe, Anonymous Tips, Investigative Stops and Inarticulate Hunches—
Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219, 227 (1991). 
 54. White, 496 U.S. at 332. 
 55. Metcalfe, supra note 53, at 220. 
 56. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2001); Jon A. York, Search 
and Seizure: Law Enforcement Officer’s Ability to Conduct Investigative Traffic Stops Based 
Upon an Anonymous Tip Alleging Dangerous Driving When the Officers Do Not Personally 
Observe Any Traffic Violations, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 173, 182 (2003) (discussing the effect 
of the White decision). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 84, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 619-25 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99, 
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driving in a drunk or erratic fashion.58  When Florida v. J.L. came up, the 
Court took the opportunity to cabin the reasonable suspicion standard in the 
context of anonymous tips. 
C. Florida v. J.L. 
In Florida v. J.L., the Court was asked to determine whether an 
anonymous tip asserting nothing more than that a person was carrying a gun 
was sufficient to give rise to a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion.59  
The pertinent facts are these: (1) an anonymous caller reported that “a 
young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt 
was carrying a gun;”60 (2) officers responded soon thereafter, and saw three 
black males hanging out at the named bus stop;61 and (3) although there was 
no other reason for suspicion besides the vague tip, the officers frisked the 
young man wearing a shirt matching the tip’s description and found a gun 
on him.62  
In making its decision as to whether the responding officers had 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop and frisk, the Court primarily 
focused on the fact that the tip contained nothing that was not readily 
observable by an uninformed bystander.63  The Court reasoned that without 
predictive information in an anonymous tip, the police have no means with 
which to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.64  The Court 
arguably carried on the reasoning seen in Alabama v. White; however, it 
gave teeth to the predictive element that the White majority so heavily 
emphasized.  In doing this, the Court stated that “reasonable suspicion . . . 
requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 
tendency to identify a determinate person.”65  As opposed to the White 
decision, where the Court reasoned that the corroboration of an anonymous 
tip which helped the police ensure they were stopping the determinate 
                                                                                                                 
102-04 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 946-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992), 
abrogated by United States v. Clipper, 313 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 58. See, e.g., State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1041-46 (Kan. 1999); State v. Sampson, 
669 A.2d 1326, 1327 (Me. 1996); State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 339-41 (N.H. 1995); 
State v. Lamb, 720 A.2d 1101, 1102-06 (Vt. 1998). 
 59. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id. at 269-72. 
 64. Id. at 271. 
 65. Id. at 272 (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h) (3d ed. 
1996)). 
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person accused in the tip passed Fourth Amendment muster, the J.L. Court 
took the predictive element a step further in requiring that the tip also “be 
reliable in its assertion of illegality.”66 
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the fact that an informant’s 
identity is unknown means that the informant is not putting his or her 
credibility on the line, and thus could lie with impunity.67  In calling in 
anonymously, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the informant does not subject 
himself or herself to ramifications if the informant provides law 
enforcement with false information.68  Further, without providing the 
predictive information so heavily focused upon in the J.L. opinion, the court 
is left without a means to judge the informant’s credibility, and thus the risk 
of false allegations becomes unacceptable.69 
The Court also declined to carve out a firearm exception from the Terry 
analysis.70  In declining to do so, the Court stated that this would go too 
far—an anonymous call could be made in order to harass a person.71 
In determining that a firearm exception would be contrary to the intent of 
the Fourth Amendment, the Court, in dicta, made a few important 
statements relevant to the development of this comment: 
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the 
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous 
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a 
showing of reliability.  We do not say, for example, that a report 
of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability 
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the 
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.72 
The Court also implied that searches of locales that possess a lower 
expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy might be justifiable based upon 
information that would be insufficient to justify searches in other 
                                                                                                                 
 66. Compare Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990), with J.L., 529 U.S. at 272 
(citing LAFAVE, supra note 65). 
 67. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 68. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (explaining the effect 
of the implications of Kennedy concurrence). 
 69. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146 
(providing information that is available to any observer increases the likelihood that the tip 
could come from anyone ranging from “a concerned citizen, prankster, or someone with a 
grudge against [the alleged drunk driver]”). 
 70. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 273-74. 
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locations.73  By stating this, the Court left open the possibility that other 
factual situations, besides one where an anonymous tip alleged the illegal 
possession of a firearm, could be weighted so heavily in favor of the 
concern for public safety that the indicia of reliability required of an 
anonymous tip could be substantially lowered.  Many courts have focused 
on this language in determining whether an anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving is sufficient to satisfy a Terry analysis.74 
D. Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma Courts’ Anonymous Tip Precedent  
Although both the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and Oklahoma courts 
have only considered whether anonymous tips give rise to reasonable 
suspicion a few times, the jurisdictions have largely mirrored what the 
Supreme Court has done.75  The 1982 case of Lunsford v. State illustrates 
how Oklahoma courts addressed whether an anonymous tip was supported 
by reasonable suspicion prior to both Alabama v. White and Florida v. 
J.L.76  In Lunsford, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that an 
investigative stop conducted solely on information provided by two 
unknown informants, where the officer knew nothing concerning the two 
informants’ reliability or identity, and where the officer did not 
independently corroborate the information in the anonymous tip prior to 
performing the stop, was not constitutionally justifiable under the Fourth 
Amendment.77   
In United States v. Hinojos, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was 
faced with the question of whether a police officer’s detainment and 
questioning of a man who was alleged to be involved in drug trafficking by 
an anonymous tipster was constitutionally permissible.78  The anonymous 
tip included the number of occupants (two males), its point of departure 
(Odessa, Texas), and time, plus its direction of travel (east on Turner 
Turnpike).79   
                                                                                                                 
 73. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting J.L., 
529 U.S. at 274). 
 74. See, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2001); State v. 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Iowa 2001); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 
2000).  
 75. See generally United States v. Hinojos, 107 F.3d 765 (10th Cir. 1997); Nilsen v. 
State, 203 P.3d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009). 
 76. See generally Lunsford v. State, 652 P.2d 1243 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). 
 77. Id. at 1245-46. 
 78. Hinojos, 107 F.3d at 767. 
 79. Id. 
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Since this case arose prior to Florida v. J.L., the Tenth Circuit relied 
heavily on Alabama v. White in its opinion.80  The court noted that the 
anonymous tip in Hinojos was very similar to that in White.81  Further, the 
court stated that even if the anonymous tip alone would not have given rise 
to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer’s actions, the 
officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description, along with the fact that 
Hinojos was driving on the highway and in the direction predicted, rendered 
the investigative stop constitutionally justifiable.82 
Finally, in a post-Florida v. J.L. decision, the Tenth Circuit considered 
whether an anonymous tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to 
justify an investigative stop that turned up the illegal possession of a 
firearm and ammunition in United States v. Copening.83  In stating that the 
stop was constitutionally justifiable, the court distinguished Copening from 
J.L. in several ways.84  First, the anonymous tipster used an unblocked 
telephone number when he called 911.85  The court found that this mitigated 
the threat of a tip designed to harass the person alleged to be in possession 
of the firearm.86  Second, the anonymous tipster specifically insisted he had 
“firsthand knowledge of the alleged conduct.”87  Third, the tip included a 
detailed description of the car the accused was driving and what the tipster 
had seen, which further bolstered the tip’s reliability.88  Fourth, the Tenth 
Circuit remarked that the tipster’s multiple 911 calls, following of the 
vehicle, and continual updating of the vehicle’s location to the 911 
dispatcher, “be[spoke] an ordinary citizen acting in good faith.”89  
Essentially, the court found these facts to further prove that the anonymous 
tipster was not trying to harass or provide police with a phony tip.90  
Finally, the officer sufficiently corroborated the tip by ensuring that it was 
based on firsthand knowledge when he followed the vehicle for a while, 
according to the tip’s instruction, prior to conducting the investigative 
stop.91 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See generally id. 
 81. Id. at 768. 
 82. Id. at 768-69. 
 83. United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 84. Id. at 1243, 1246-47. 
 85. Id. at 1247. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 496 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007)). 
 88. Id. (citing United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 554-55 (10th Cir. 2002)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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Although the Tenth Circuit ruled this way in Copening, it stressed that its 
ruling was purely fact-driven, and that because the anonymous-informant 
context requires “significant ‘skepticism and careful scrutiny,’”92 it was not 
carving out a blanket exception that anonymous tips always give rise to 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify investigative stops under the 
Fourth Amendment.93 
III. Split in Authority 
Whether the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to conduct 
investigative stops based on anonymous tips alleging drunk driving is a 
pressing question that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed, and it has 
“deeply divided federal and state courts.”94  While some of the Court’s 
decisions allow law enforcement to perform investigative stops based upon 
reasonable suspicion,95 J.L. cabined the ability of law enforcement officers 
to act based on anonymous tips alone because, absent independent 
corroboration, anonymous tips were held typically to lack the indicia of 
reliability required to justify investigative stops based on reasonable 
suspicion.96  Nevertheless, the Court in J.L. did leave open the possibility 
that the Fourth Amendment might require less in cases of greater danger.97  
The Court also stated that searches of places that possess a lower 
expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy than that of the physical person 
might be permissible based on lesser reliability.98   
Many lower courts, including the only federal circuit court to consider 
the issue,99 have placed great weight on this language in holding that stops 
based on nothing more than anonymous tips are justifiable under the Fourth 
Amendment.100  Although this is the majority view, a significant minority 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Id. at 1247 (quoting Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 
1985)). 
 93. Id. at 1247-48. 
 94. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. (citing United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. Wells, 
136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v. 
Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); 
State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); 
State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); State 
v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001). 
 96. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 10 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)). 
 97. See id. at 11 (citing J.L., 529 U.S. at 273). 
 98. Id. at 10 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 274). 
 99. See generally Wheat, 278 F.3d 722. 
 100. See, e.g., id. at 736-37; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 630; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
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of courts have held the exact opposite and found that these stops are 
unconstitutional because they are an unnecessary intrusion on a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.101  It is this split in authority that must be 
further considered in order fully to understand the complexity of the issue 
that the Supreme Court has thus far failed to resolve.102  
In considering the rationale behind either allowing or prohibiting these 
stops, keep in mind that a typical factual situation is as follows: (1) the 
informant that reports the alleged drunk driving does not generally provide 
his or her name;103 (2) the tip usually includes only descriptive information 
of the car, such as the make and color, at least a partial license plate, a 
general location of the vehicle’s whereabouts, and is commonly 
accompanied by a conclusory statement as to the car’s being driven 
erratically;104 and (3) the responding officer does not independently 
                                                                                                                 
 101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); 
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 
(Wyo. 1999). 
 102. See Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“This is an important 
question that is not answered by our past decisions, and that has deeply divided federal and 
state courts.”). 
 103. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724, 737 (allowing the stop even though the 
caller did not identify himself), People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811, 816 (Cal. 2006) 
(allowing the stop even though “[t]he record is silent as to the identity of the caller . . . .”), 
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 626, 630 (allowing the stop even though “the caller would not give 
a name”), and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (holding the stop to be constitutionally 
justifiable in a case involving an anonymous report), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290, 
293 (holding a stop to be unconstitutional when tip concerning erratic truck driving was 
made by unidentified motorist), Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 147 (disallowing the stop when 
tipster was anonymous), and McChesney 988 P.2d at 1073, 1078 (holding a stop based on an 
anonymous tip to be unconstitutional). 
 104. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724, 737 (permitting the stop when the tip stated 
that “[a] tan-and cream-colored Nissan Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters 
W-O-C, was being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169 . . .” and 
complaining “that the Nissan was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other 
cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a ‘complete maniac’”), State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 
83, 84, 90 (permitting the stop when “[t]he informant gave the license plate number of the 
vehicle . . . described the vehicle as a blue Toyota Tacoma pickup . . .” and that the 
informant had seen the driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling pretty badly . . .”), 
and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (permitting a stop based on a tip that a “blue-purple 
Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between Exits 10 and 11, 
[was] operating erratically”), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290, 293 (holding 
unconstitutional a stop based on a tip that stated that “a pickup truck with Massachusetts 
license plate number D34-314 was traveling on the wrong side of Route 195 in the vicinity 
of Route 140 in New Bedford” and that “the truck had slowed down, crossed the grassy 
median strip, and then proceeded onto the correct side of the highway”), Harris, 668 S.E.2d 
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corroborate anything other than the descriptive details located in the 
anonymous tip before conducting an investigative stop.105  
A. Courts That Hold These Stops to Be Constitutionally Justifiable 
As previously stated, the majority of courts that have considered this 
issue have upheld these stops as constitutionally justifiable.106  According to 
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent from the denial of certiorari from a recent 
case petitioned to the Court, these courts have upheld these stops based on 
some combination of four reasons:  
(1) the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by drunk 
driving; (2) the enhanced reliability of tips alleging illegal 
activity in public, to which the tipster was presumably an 
                                                                                                                 
at 147 (holding unconstitutional a stop based on a tip that stated that “there was a[n] 
intoxicated driver in the 3400 block of Meadowbridge Road, [who] was named Joseph 
Harris, and he was driving [a green] Altima, headed south, towards the city, possibly 
towards the south side”), and McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073, 1078 (holding unconstitutional 
a stop based a tip that stated that “a red Mercury with temporary plates was weaving 
between lanes, passing cars, and slowing down in order to pass them again” and that the car 
“was traveling east on Interstate 90 twenty-five miles west of Gillette”). 
 105. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724-25, 737 (upholding a stop in which the 
officer matched the makes and partial license plate number given in an anonymous tip 
“without having observed any incidents of erratic driving”), Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 626, 
630 (upholding a stop when “[t]he arresting officer located the car and stopped it, solely on 
the basis of the call; he did not personally observe any behavior that would generate 
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop”), and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (“This was not an 
officer seeking independent verification that a driver was intoxicated, but rather one intent 
upon catching and stopping as soon as practically possible a driver whom he already 
suspected of being under the influence.”), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290, 293 (holding 
the stop unconstitutional when “[the arresting officer] made the stop of the truck as a result 
of the unidentified motorist’s report, and not because of any observations he made 
concerning the operation of the vehicle”), Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146, 147 (holding the stop 
unconstitutional when the officer, during the hearing suppression, “did not describe Harris’ 
driving as erratic” before he acted on the anonymous tip and conducted a stop), and 
McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073-74, 1078 (holding unconstitutional the stop when “[d]uring 
the time [the officer followed the alleged drunk driver, the officer] did not observe any 
erratic driving or any violations of the law,” yet he still conducted an investigative stop 
based upon the tip).  
 106. See Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale 
v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); People 
v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625; State v. 
Crawford, 67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); Scholl, 684 
N.W.2d 83; State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44 (Tenn. 2009); Boyea, 765 A.2d 862; State v. 
Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001). 
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eyewitness; (3) the fact that traffic stops are typically less 
invasive than searches or seizures of individuals on foot; and (4) 
the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals 
driving their cars on public roads.107   
1. Drunk Driving and Its Unique Dangers 
The reason most heavily focused upon by courts adhering to the majority 
view is the fact that drunk driving poses a significant risk to the public.  
Virtually every court holding these stops to be constitutional has been 
persuaded by the dangers surrounding drunk driving.108  The only time a 
federal appellate court has considered the issue was in United States v. 
Wheat.109  In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the situation of an 
anonymous tip alleging a person driving drunk from that in J.L., because 
“[i]n contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an 
anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway presents a 
qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency 
for prompt action.”110   
To go along with the increased level of danger associated with 
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving, the Eighth Circuit noted a critical 
distinction between cases where a person is alleged to possess a gun (like 
the situation in J.L.) and those where a person is alleged to be driving 
drunk.111  Officers have less invasive choices at their disposal in alleged 
possessory offense cases.112  In alleged possessory offense cases, officers 
can either “initiate a simple consensual encounter, for which no articulable 
suspicion is required,”113 or officers can watch a person alleged to be 
illegally possessing a firearm, essentially looking for suspicious activity 
that would give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be 
afoot, as was done in Terry.114 
Since police officers do not have these less invasive options at their 
disposal with alleged drunk drivers, they only have two choices.  An officer 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 11-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 108. See Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; Wells, 136 P.3d 810; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d 1212; 
Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714; Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625; Crawford, 
67 P.3d 115; Golotta, 837 A.2d 359; Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83; Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44; 
Boyea, 765 A.2d 86; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516. 
 109. See 278 F.3d 722. 
 110. Id. at 729 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867). 
 111. See id. at 736-37. 
 112. Id. at 736. 
 113. Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1984) (per curiam)). 
 114. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968)). 
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can either stop the automobile immediately to check if the driver is 
operating under the influence of alcohol, or that officer can sit back and 
watch the driver.115  If the officer elects to sit back and watch the driver, 
this will inevitably lead to three possible outcomes:  (1) the alleged drunk 
driver continues harmlessly down the road for several miles, and the officer 
stops his surveillance and leaves the driver alone; (2) the alleged drunk 
driver weaves onto the shoulder, injuring nobody and corroborating the 
anonymous tip; or (3) the alleged drunk driver swerves into oncoming 
traffic, runs a stop light, or otherwise causes extreme harm in a traffic 
accident.116 
In referencing the dicta from J.L., several courts have gone so far as to 
liken drunk drivers to mobile bombs.117  Even those that have not reached 
for this analogy have either directly stated or insinuated that drunk driving 
poses a much greater level of danger than a person illegally possessing a 
firearm and that, therefore, drunk driving probably falls into what is 
commonly known as the “public safety exception” found in the J.L. dicta.118 
Regardless of whether these courts have likened drunk drivers to mobile 
bombs, or stated or insinuated that drunk drivers pose such a level of danger 
as to meet the public safety exception found in the J.L. dicta, virtually all 
courts finding that these stops are constitutionally justifiable have held that 
drunk driving poses such an imminent level of danger that it is in the best 
interest of both the general public and the alleged drunk driver that these 
stops be allowed.119  This way, a police officer can make a quick check, 
rather than being powerless to pull over an alleged drunk driver, essentially 
giving the driver “one free swerve.”120 
  
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. (citing Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862). 
 116. Id. at 736-37.  
 117. See, e.g., id. at 737 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 (“[A] drunk driver is not at all 
unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.”)); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 
2003) (quoting State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1046 (Kan. 1999) (“A motor vehicle in the 
hands of a drunken driver is an instrument of death.  It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the 
public, and that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”)); State v. Golotta, 837 
A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 2003) (quoting State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 396 (N.J. 1987) (“We 
find the bomb example [in the J.L. dicta] to be particularly apt because, . . . this Court 
previously has described intoxicated motorists as ‘moving time bombs.’”)). 
 118. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000). 
 119. See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. 
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2. Increased Reliability of Anonymous Tips 
Another factor that many courts have found to be in favor of allowing 
these stops is that the great majority of tips come from eyewitnesses to the 
erratic driving and are thus considered to be more reliable than tips alleging 
concealed criminal activity.121  Courts have held that the risk of an 
anonymous caller falsely reporting a person’s driving drunk is significantly 
lower when the caller is viewing the erratic driving.  In considering the 
increased reliability of anonymous tips in the context of drunk driving, the 
Eighth Circuit in Wheat stated:  
[A] careful reading of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the predictive 
aspects of an anonymous tip [as seen in Florida v. J.L.] may be 
less applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous, 
readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of erratic 
driving witnessed by another motorist.122 
Further, the Eighth Circuit noted that neither White nor J.L. created a rule 
requiring a tip to contain predictive elements because this would be 
contrary to the totality of circumstances test enunciated by the Court.123  
Unlike both White and J.L., the Eighth Circuit reasoned, the basis of an 
informant’s knowledge is most always apparent in drunk driving tips, 
because these tips come from eyewitness observations.124 
A Supreme Court of Vermont justice enunciated this exact sentiment in a 
concurrence in State v. Boyea: 
The offense alleged here did not involve a concealed crime—a 
possessory offense.  What was described in the police dispatch to 
the arresting officer was a crime in progress, carried out in 
public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its 
commission.  Unlike the tip alleged in White—that White was 
                                                                                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734-35 (stating that unlike possessory offense crimes, 
where the predictive information requirement may be the only way an informant’s 
knowledge can be corroborated, in erratic driving cases, the tip “[a]lmost always . . . comes 
from . . . eyewitness observations”); Golotta, 837 A.2d at 367-68 (noting that anonymous 
tips placed through the 911 system are, by their nature, more reliable); State v. Hanning, 296 
S.W.3d 44, 49-50 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993) 
(“[W]hen an informant reports an incident at or near the time of its occurrence, a court can 
often assume that the report is first-hand, and hence reliable.”)). 
 122. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734. 
 123. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1125 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995)). 
 124. See id. 
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carrying narcotics— . . . here a total stranger could have 
observed defendant’s driving abilities.  No intimate or 
confidential relationship was required to support the accuracy of 
the observation.  The caller simply reported a contemporaneous 
observation of criminal activity taking place in his line of 
sight.125 
In Bloomingdale v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that 
another reason that anonymous tips involving drunk drivers are generally 
more reliable is that these tips deal with automobiles.126  “It would be 
difficult for a tipster accurately to place a moving vehicle in a particular 
location at a specific time if the tipster has not immediately observed that 
vehicle.”127  Because of this, the court held that law enforcement should be 
able to give greater weight to an anonymous tip alleging unsafe driving 
when the factual situation includes:  “(a) the precise description of the 
vehicle; and (b) the officer’s corroboration of the descriptive features of the 
vehicle and the location of its travel [is] in close temporal proximity to 
when the report was made.”128 
Finally, many of these courts have addressed Kennedy’s concurrence in 
J.L. about the concern of harassment associated with reliance on 
anonymous tips.  The gist of the consideration of the risk of harassment is 
that the risk of bad-natured hoaxes carried out by private citizens is 
outweighed by the considerable government interest in initiating a stop as 
soon as possible.129 
Again, as seen with the reasoning by most courts in holding that drunk 
driving possesses a unique and imminent danger sufficient to distinguish it 
from J.L., the reasoning employed by the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme 
Courts of Delaware and Vermont are merely representative—most courts 
have used similar logic in holding that anonymous tips provide reasonable 
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. 
3. Traffic Stops Possess Less Invasive Qualities than Searches and 
Seizures on Foot 
Another way that courts adhering to the majority position distinguish the 
factual situation of an alleged drunk driver from the one in J.L. is that an 
                                                                                                                 
 125. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (Skoglund, J., concurring). 
 126. Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220-21 (Del. 2004). 
 127. Id. at 1221. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 735-36; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1220-21; State v. 
Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009). 
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investigative traffic stop is typically less invasive of individual privacy than 
a search and seizure on foot.130  The Eighth Circuit in Wheat readily 
acknowledged that people have the right to proceed unmolested on public 
roads, and that investigative stops intrude upon that right.131  In 
differentiating the investigative traffic stop from the publicly seen frisk that 
was considered in J.L., however, the Eighth Circuit stated that investigative 
traffic stops are “considerably less invasive, both physically and 
psychologically.”132 
In State v. Boyea, the Supreme Court of Vermont stated that because an 
investigative stop and questioning was at issue, as opposed to “a hands-on 
violation of the person,” the liberty interest at stake was not of as high of a 
level as was seen in the J.L. case.133  The concurrence in Boyea even looked 
at Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, where the Supreme Court held 
that sobriety checkpoints were constitutional.134  In doing so, the 
concurrence noted that the Court found that the sobriety checkpoint stop 
only slightly intruded upon motorists, which weighed in favor of allowing 
sobriety checkpoints to exist.135  The concurrence finally implied that the 
properties of the investigative traffic stop were similar to the sobriety 
checkpoint stop, which in turn implied that the investigative traffic stop 
only slightly intrudes upon motorists.136 
In another case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that an 
investigative traffic stop differed from the stop and frisk seen in J.L. in that 
the intervention by the police was brief and did not entail physical contact 
between the officer and alleged drunk driver.137  Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Iowa differentiated the drunk driver/anonymous tip situation from 
J.L. because the intrusion on privacy is less than that associated with a pat-
down situation.138  Although not all courts in the majority position have 
                                                                                                                 
 130. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (noting that investigative traffic stops are 
considerably less invasive than a public stop and frisk); Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 51 (noting 
that an investigative stop lacks the physical contact of a stop and frisk, and is thus less 
invasive).  
 131. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)). 
 132. Id. 
 133. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000). 
 134. See id. at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring). 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (implying that if the Court considered the issue at bar, “a brief investigative 
stop that poses less intrusion than a physical search of the person” would weigh in favor of 
allowing the search under the Fourth Amendment, as the Court held it to do in Sitz). 
 137. State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009). 
 138. State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Iowa 2001). 
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considered the lower level of invasiveness posed by an investigative traffic 
stop as a means for distinguishing the drunk driving situation from that in 
J.L., the courts that have considered it have all accepted this line of 
reasoning. 
4. Drivers Possess a Diminished Expectation of Privacy on the Road 
Finally, at least one court differentiated the drunk driving situation from 
that in J.L. by reasoning that drivers possess a diminished expectation of 
privacy on public roads.139  This is because “in light of the pervasive 
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, 
individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a 
vehicle on public thoroughfares.”140  In stating this, the Supreme Court of 
California was looking at the line of United States Supreme Court cases 
considering and allowing sobriety checkpoints.141  In order to justify 
sobriety checkpoints, the Court, along with other federal courts, announced 
that individuals driving on public roads possess a lower expectation of 
privacy while on those public roads.142 
B. The Minority View: These Stops Violate the Fourth Amendment 
Although the majority position is that traffic stops based on nothing 
more than anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are constitutionally 
permissible, the minority takes a different stance; holding that these stops, 
absent prior independent corroboration of drunken driving by law 
enforcement, are prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.143  The courts in 
the minority position focus heavily on the J.L. opinion, holding that an 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is not factually distinct enough from 
the anonymous tip that alleged the concealed possession of the firearm.144  
                                                                                                                 
 139. See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 816 (Cal. 2006). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1990); 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 
(1985) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973)); 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra 
note 18, § 192. 
 143. See State v. Sparen, No. CR00258199S, 2001 WL 206078 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9, 
2001); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); State v. 
Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994); Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); 
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2009); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 
(Wyo. 1999). 
 144. See, e.g., Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45 (noting that the anonymous tip required 
independent police corroboration prior to the investigative stop); Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 527  
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As a result, the minority typically focuses on:  (1) the lack of reliability 
associated with anonymous informants;145 (2) both the lack of predictive 
information located in the tips, which would not be readily available to 
uninformed bystanders, and the risk of harassment associated with 
anonymous tips;146 and (3) that the risk associated with drunk driving does 
not justify side-stepping an important constitutional restraint as found in the 
Fourth Amendment.147   
1. Lack of Reliability Associated with Anonymous Informants 
In one of the most recent cases that an anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving has been considered, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Harris v. 
Commonwealth, relied heavily on the language in J.L. dealing with 
decreased reliability associated with anonymous tips.148  In Harris, the 
court stated that anonymous tips are relatively unreliable, which means 
more information is required in order for a responding officer to 
corroborate sufficiently the allegations contained in such tips.149  Further, 
quoting Alabama v. White, the court stated, “an anonymous tip alone 
seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.”150   
Similarly, holding that an investigative stop based solely upon an 
anonymous tip was constitutionally prohibited, the Court of Appeals of 
Texas, in Hall v. State, leaned heavily upon the fact that anonymous tips are 
considered less reliable.151  Since the tip at issue was less reliable due to its 
anonymity, the test laid out in Alabama v. White required a greater level of 
information to give rise to reasonable suspicion.152  Further, in quoting a 
prior decision, the court maintained, “a police officer generally cannot rely 
                                                                                                                 
(noting that, as in J.L., the anonymous tip was not sufficiently corroborated by police prior 
to stop); Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (noting that the alleged driver’s actions were not enough 
to give reasonable suspicion to the police officer, prior to his instigating an investigative 
stop). 
 145. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45; Hall, 
74 S.W.3d at 525-27; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1075-77. 
 146. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45; Hall, 
74 S.W.3d at 525-27; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1075-77. 
 147. See Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 884-85 (Vt. 
2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 148. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46. 
 149. Id. at 145 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)). 
 150. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). 
 151. See Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525. 
 152. Id. 
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on a police broadcast of an anonymous phone call to establish reasonable 
suspicion.”153 
All of the minority jurisdictions hold that something more than a bare-
bones tip is required to give rise to reasonable suspicion.154  This increased 
indicia of reliability can come from “an officer’s prior knowledge and 
experience,”155 predictive information with which to test the anonymous 
informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity,156 or even an increased 
number of calls making the same allegations.157 
2. Lack of Predictive Information/Risk of Harassment 
Another heavily emphasized reason for disallowing these stops is that 
anonymous tips generally include information that is readily available to 
anyone.158  This was another reason for disallowing the stop and frisk that 
was seen in J.L.159  There, the Supreme Court stated that this information is 
valuable because it helps the police correctly identify the accused.160  
However, this information is only valuable to a point, because without 
predictive information relating to the alleged criminal activity, police 
officers have no means with which to test the “informant’s knowledge or 
credibility.”161 
In Harris v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned 
that an anonymous tip, which included the location of the vehicle, its make, 
color, license plate number, driver’s name, and stated that the car was 
“headed south, towards the city, possibly towards the south side,” did not 
suffice as predictive information.162  Further, the court stated that an 
anonymous tip does not need to include such predictive information when it 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 234-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 154. See, e.g., id. (noting that “there must be some further indicia . . . from which a police 
officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified”); Harris, 
668 S.E.2d at 145-46 (noting that a bare-boned tip, without predictive information, does not 
give rise to reasonable suspicion). 
 155. Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525. 
 156. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)). 
 157. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642 (N.D. 1994) (citing State v. Kettleson, 486 
N.W.2d 227, 228 (N.D. 1992)). 
 158. See, e.g., id.; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145; McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1076-
77 (Wyo. 1999). 
 159. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72 (“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a 
tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 
person.”). 
 160. Id. at 272. 
 161. Id. at 271. 
 162. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146. 
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is alleging a readily observable criminal activity.163  In direct conflict with 
the courts in the majority, however, the court maintained that the crime of 
drunk driving is not, in and of itself, a readily observable criminal action.164  
Accordingly, the court stated that a police officer must personally see the 
instance of drunk driving prior to being justified in conducting an 
investigative stop.165  
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that an 
investigative stop based upon a tip that gave details about the alleged drunk 
driver that could be easily obtained by the general public was 
unconstitutional.166  In State v. Miller, the informant claimed he was 
working at a local Wendy’s, and a driver waiting in the drive-thru line 
“could barely hold his head up.”167  The court declared that while this tip 
did give some evidence of possible criminal activity, the informant’s 
allegation did not give rise to reasonable suspicion, absent the police officer 
independently corroborating the driver’s drunkenness prior to conducting 
an investigative stop.168 
These courts reason that if they allow police to conduct investigative 
stops based solely upon tips providing information readily available to 
uninformed bystanders, the possibility of the anonymous tip coming from a 
prankster or someone with a grudge would greatly increase.169  Further, 
referencing the Kennedy concurrence in J.L., it would allow tipsters to lie 
with impunity.170 
3. Danger Posed by Drunk Driving Not Enough 
Although somewhat implicit, proponents of the minority view deny that 
the increased risk posed by drunk drivers warrants allowing police officers 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 146. 
 164. Compare id., with United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (“The offense alleged here did not 
involve a concealed crime – a possessory offense.  What was described . . . was a crime in 
progress, carried out in public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its 
commission.”)). 
 165. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146. 
 166. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642-43 (N.D. 1994). 
 167. Id. at 639. 
 168. Id. at 644. 
 169. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Mass. 1990) (“The 
corroboration went only to obvious details . . . .  Anyone can telephone police for any 
reason.”)); Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146.  
 170. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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to conduct investigative stops based solely on anonymous tips.171  
Dissenting in State v. Boyea, Justice Johnson stated, “public safety is not a 
novel concern of this century.”172  He then traced the history of the Fourth 
Amendment, focusing on the fact that when the Framers of the Constitution 
crafted the Fourth Amendment, they did so against the backdrop of living 
“under a system of unbridled search and seizure allegedly justified by 
dozens of ‘dangers’ that evolved in the British common law and statute 
books.”173 
In Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
made two arguments based on the exigencies associated with drunk 
driving.174  First, the Commonwealth argued that such an anonymous tip 
fell under the “emergency doctrine,” as crafted in Massachusetts state 
courts.175  Essentially, the emergency doctrine entails that there is a 
situation that requires immediate police action in order to protect life and 
property.176  The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, however, stated that this 
doctrine did not apply. When the officer came across the alleged drunk 
driver, the driver was not driving erratically.177  The court came to this 
conclusion even though the anonymous informant had stayed on the phone 
with the police and was following the vehicle, eventually seeing the vehicle 
driving on the wrong side of the road.178  The reason for not recognizing the 
emergency doctrine was that the driver was on the correct side of the road 
when the officer came across him, and thus no emergency existed when the 
officer could have acted.179   
Moreover, the Commonwealth argued that a “community caretaking 
function” applied.  This allows police, without reasonable suspicion, to do 
such things as check on people in rest areas during cold weather, or other 
activities associated with the officer’s concern for a person’s well-being.180  
                                                                                                                 
 171. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93 (implying that the circumstances were 
not exigent enough to give credence to emergency or community-caretaking exception 
arguments); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 884-85 (Vt. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(noting that during the crafting of the Fourth Amendment, many other comparable dangers 
existed). 
 172. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 884-85 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93. 
 175. Id. at 291-92. 
 176. Id. at 292. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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The Court of Appeals of Massachusetts held firm, though, stating that this 
exception could not be applied in instances where police officers were 
detecting, investigating, or acquiring evidence for the purpose of applying it 
to a person’s violation of criminal law.181 
By not giving credence to either one of these arguments, the 
Massachusetts court implied that the drunk driving situation did not impose 
such a high level of danger on the public as to fall into Justice Ginsberg’s 
dicta in J.L.182  Similarly, in McChesney v. State, where an anonymous 
tipster hotline was set up for the specific purpose of pulling drunk drivers 
off the road, the Supreme Court of Wyoming relied on highway patrol 
protocol when it ruled unconstitutional a stop based solely on an 
anonymous tip.183  The highway patrol in Wyoming had been taught to 
respond to anonymous tips if they could “establish probable cause based 
upon their own observations[,] not relying on the [anonymous tips].”184  
Again, it is implicit in this that the Supreme Court of Wyoming did not hold 
the dangers associated with a possible drunk driver sufficient to allow 
police to sidestep the Fourth Amendment, absent independent corroboration 
of the erratic driving prior to the investigative stop.185 
C. Oklahoma Takes the Minority Position 
In the 2009 case of Nilsen v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals—Oklahoma’s highest criminal court—considered the issue of 
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving.186  In Nilsen, an anonymous 
informant called into 911 and alleged that he or she had seen a person 
“drinking a beer while driving.”187  The tip included a description of the 
alleged drunk driver’s vehicle, its license plate number, and a general 
location of its whereabouts.188  A deputy sheriff located a vehicle matching 
the anonymous tip’s description, and without observing any traffic violation 
or indication of criminal activity, conducted an investigative stop of the 
vehicle.189  At trial, the deputy testified that “he observed no traffic offense, 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 988 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1999). 
 184. Id. at 1077-78. 
 185. See id. (reasoning that law enforcement is taught not to rely solely on REDDI tips, 
holding that the tip was not itself sufficient, and implying that the situation was not exigent 
enough to sidestep a requirement). 
 186. See generally Nilsen v. State, 203 P.3d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009). 
 187. Id. at 190. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 191. 
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no equipment failure or anything else that would have provided a basis for 
the stop” prior to pulling the vehicle over.190 
In a summary opinion, the court traced the evolution of the case law 
regarding anonymous tips in the context of drunk driving.191  The court 
stated that the key to Alabama v. White was that the police officer 
sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip when the officer verified 
“significant aspects of the caller’s predictions” prior to conducting the 
investigative stop.192  The court then stated that the modest amount of 
reliability in White was not present in J.L. due to the lack of predictive 
information in the tip, which left no means for the police to test the tipster’s 
knowledge or credibility.193  The court then stressed the portion of J.L. that 
strengthened the predictive element requirement: 
While the [J.L.] Court acknowledged that the caller had provided 
an accurate description of the subject’s ‘readily observable 
location and appearance’ which helped the police identify the 
accused it noted that ‘[s]uch a tip, however, does not show that 
the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.  The 
reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable 
in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a 
determinate person.’194   
After looking to precedent on the issue, the court sided with the minority 
of jurisdictions.  It found that an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving, 
combined with a description of the accused’s vehicle, the vehicle’s general 
location, and the vehicle’s license plate number, did not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop under the 
Fourth Amendment.195  The reasoning for this was threefold:  (1) the 
informant was anonymous, and thus law enforcement had no way to assess 
the reliability of the tip; (2) there was a heightened risk of false accusation 
due to the informant remaining anonymous; and (3) the tip included only a 
means for which the responding officer could identify the accused drunk 
driver and did not contain predictive information that would help the 
responding officer corroborate the allegation of drunk driving.196 
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Roughly one death occurs every forty-eight minutes in America due to 
alcohol-related traffic accidents.197  In 2009, the 10,839 deaths associated 
with alcohol-impaired driving accounted for thirty-two percent of the total 
number of traffic fatalities in the United States.198  In Oklahoma, the 
statistic is in perfect correlation with the national number—thirty-two 
percent of all traffic fatalities in the state, or 235 deaths, resulted from 
alcohol-impaired drivers in traffic accidents in 2009.199  Notwithstanding 
the statistics, a blanket exception to traditional Fourth Amendment 
protections, as advanced by the majority position, is unwarranted. 
The overarching standard for Fourth Amendment reasonableness entails 
balancing the invasiveness of a given search or seizure against the 
governmental interest in performing the search or seizure.200  As stated in 
White and applied in J.L., an anonymous tip can lead to reasonable 
suspicion when the tip contains either a sufficient quantity of information, 
or degree of reliability, when viewed under the totality of the 
circumstances.201   
Applying the White/J.L. rule to the drunk driving situation, the majority 
of investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips alleging drunk 
driving are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  First, the level of 
invasiveness posed by the investigative traffic stop associated with the 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is much lower than that posed by the 
stop and frisk search associated with the anonymous tip alleging a 
concealed possessory offense.  This sets a low threshold to meet in terms of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  As a result of this low threshold, a 
lower degree of reliability is required of the anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving than was required of the tip in J.L.  
Although unnecessary, the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving 
possesses relatively high indicia of reliability.  Thus, because there are 
several factors present in the drunk driving situation that when weighed in 
the totality of the circumstances surpass the threshold required by the low 
                                                                                                                 
 197. See DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY 
FACTS OKLAHOMA 2005-2009, at 6 (2009), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot. 
gov/departments/nrd-30/ncsa/STSI/40_OK/2009/40_OK_2009.PDF. 
 198. See id. 
 199. See id.  
 200. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 
523, 537-38 (1967). 
 201. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-72 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 
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level of invasiveness posed by the situation, most investigative stops are 
reasonable even without independent police corroboration.  Some of these 
factors are always present in the drunk driving situation.  For example, 
anonymous tips are not very “anonymous” anymore.  Also, the crime of 
erratic driving is a readily observable criminal action. 
Even though these factors alone are typically not enough to weigh in 
favor of a reasonable stop under the Fourth Amendment, when other factors 
are present, the situation possesses indicia of reliability high enough to 
grant reasonable suspicion to the responding officer.  First, when a tip 
comes from a firsthand observer, it makes it more likely that the assertions 
of illegality in that tip are legitimate.  Moreover, when a tip provides a 
certain detail of information so that a responding officer can easily find the 
accused in a short amount of time, it further provides for greater indicia of 
reliability. 
When all of these factors exist in a given situation, the anonymous tip 
alleging drunk driving possesses a degree of reliability high enough, under 
the totality of the circumstances, to give rise to reasonable suspicion 
sufficient to justify an investigative stop, even without prior independent 
police corroboration.  This degree of reliability is more than sufficient to 
meet the low threshold set by the level of invasiveness posed by the 
investigative stop.  When some factors are not present, it is likely that a stop 
would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  Finally, in cases 
that can be considered “close calls,” the social policy that has been 
advanced by the Court in attempting to rid roads of drunk drivers pushes 
these cases over the edge of reasonableness, so to speak, thereby rendering 
the investigative stop constitutional. 
A. Drunk Driving Does Not Fit into the Public Safety Exception 
First, a blanket “drunk driving exception” from traditional Fourth 
Amendment protections, as advocated by the majority position, is 
unwarranted.  In Florida v. J.L., Justice Ginsburg, in dicta, created what has 
come to be known as the public safety exception for anonymous tips.  
Justice Ginsburg stated that there could be situations where the level of 
danger associated with the alleged criminal activity in an anonymous tip 
could be so great as to justify an investigative police search even though a 
given tip lacks the usual requirement for reliability.202  Although the Court 
refrained from enumerating the situations that would fit into this paradigm, 
Justice Ginsburg used the example of a tip alleging a person carrying a 
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bomb as being sufficiently dangerous to not require the same indicia of 
reliability prior to police being able to conduct a Terry stop 
constitutionally.203  Virtually every court in the majority position has held 
that the drunk driver poses a similar danger to the public as a bomb,204 
which means that these courts have found that the drunk driving situation 
fits into this public safety exception paradigm. 
The drunk driver does pose a real danger to the public.  Despite this, 
courts that have held to the majority view primarily because of the idea that 
the drunk driver fits into the public safety exception paradigm are incorrect.  
Some courts may argue the drunk driver fits into this paradigm because of a 
combination of the number of deaths that drunk driving causes, the 
imminence of the threat posed by drunk driving, and because the drunk 
driver is similar to a mobile bomb.205 
It is true that roughly 120,000 people have lost their lives in alcohol-
related traffic accidents since 2000 when the J.L. decision was 
announced.206  The number of gun-related deaths between 2000 and 2007, 
however, is nearly double that at 238,405.207  If the allegation in J.L. of the 
illegal gun possession was not enough to justify a public safety exception, 
then the allegation of a different criminal activity, drunk driving, which 
causes roughly half the number of deaths that guns do, should not be treated 
as per se reasonable based solely on the harm it causes. 
Hence, something more is needed.  Courts adhering to the majority view 
state that the drunk driver is much more like a bomb in that at any given 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. 
 204. See, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting State 
v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000) (“[A] drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and 
a mobile one at that.”)); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003) (quoting State v. 
Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1046 (Kan. 1999) (“A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver 
is an instrument of death.  It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and that threat 
must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”)); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 
2003) (quoting State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 396 (N.J. 1987) (“We find the bomb example 
[in the J.L. dicta] to be particularly apt because . . . this Court previously has described 
intoxicated motorists as ‘moving time bombs.’”)). 
 205. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815 (Cal. 
2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1221 (Del. 2004); Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867. 
 206. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC 
SAFETY FACTS, 2 fig. 1 (2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ncsa/pdf 
/2010/811385.pdf. 
 207. U.S. Firearm Deaths and Death Rates Per 100,000 Population by Year Group and 
Intent, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/ 
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(last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
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point in time a drunk driver can lose control of his or her vehicle, much like 
at any given point in time a bomb can be detonated.208  The problem with 
this reasoning is that it fails to take into account the fact that someone 
illegally possessing a gun can pull the gun out and shoot at any moment.  
Just like the drunk driver can lose control of his or her vehicle at any time, a 
person possessing a gun can cause harm to the public in an instant.  Thus, 
the drunk driving situation is no more dangerous than the situation where a 
person illegally possesses a gun; in fact, based solely upon the statistics, the 
drunk driving situation is less dangerous.  Since the drunk driving situation 
is no more dangerous to the public than the illegal possession of a gun 
(which did not fit into the public safety exception), the drunk driving 
situation does not fit into Justice Ginsburg’s public safety exception 
paradigm.   
Furthermore, the public safety exception in J.L. is only dicta.209  By its 
very definition, dictum is not controlling judicial precedent.210  Thus, the 
majority’s primarily basing its holding on this public safety exception 
language is inappropriate.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that all 
investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips alleging drunk 
driving are per se unreasonable.   
B. Low Level of Invasiveness Posed by Investigative Traffic Stop Sets Low 
Threshold  
While the majority holding is flawed in primarily grounding its 
reasoning in J.L.’s dicta, most anonymous tips alleging drunk driving do 
justify responding officers performing investigative stops based solely on 
these tips.  To begin with, investigative traffic stops associated with 
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving pose a low level of invasiveness to 
the public.  This sets a low bar for the totality of the circumstances to meet 
in terms of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  
The reasoning for this low level of invasiveness is twofold:  (1) the 
investigative traffic stop occurs in a vehicle—a place so heavily regulated 
by the government that it is hard to see how a person could have a high 
expectation of privacy while operating one; and (2) in an initial 
investigative traffic stop, there is no physical contact between the police 
officer and the suspect. 
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1. Lower Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles 
It is no secret that in order to operate a motor vehicle legally on a public 
thoroughfare, many requirements must be met.  In Oklahoma, these include 
acquiring an appropriate driver’s license, having automobile insurance, 
having a current license tag, registration, and title for one’s vehicle, one’s 
vehicle meeting certain minimum safety requirements, wearing a seat belt 
while driving, and properly using child restraint seats when carrying a child 
under six years of age.211  All of these regulations have led the Supreme 
Court of the United States to consistently hold that occupants of 
automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy while operating these 
automobiles.212 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a diminished expectation of privacy 
associated with motor vehicles does not automatically mean that a police 
stop for any reason is justified.  But it does mean that less indicia of 
reliability possessed by an anonymous tip will suffice to meet Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness.  There is no similar case law stating that, 
despite the various regulations a person has to abide by while in public—
having a license to carry a gun,213 wearing clothes,214 not jaywalking,215 
etc.—a person’s physical self possesses a lower expectation of privacy.  
Granted, an automobile being pulled over by a police officer is still invasive 
like the Terry stop and frisk in J.L. in that the nature of the stop is 
investigative—the officer is looking for evidence of a crime.  Nonetheless, 
because of the Supreme Court’s consistently noting this decreased 
expectation of privacy associated with automobiles, the investigative traffic 
stop, which occurs while the person is in an automobile, poses a low level 
of invasiveness to the public.   
2. No Physical Contact in an Investigative Stop 
Another reason the investigative traffic stop poses a low level of 
invasiveness is that there is no physical contact in an initial investigative 
stop in response to drunk driving allegations.  Conversely, there is clear 
physical contact between the officer and the suspect when a Terry stop and 
frisk is conducted to search for a concealed weapon.  This may seem all too 
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obvious.  The fact is, however, that because of this difference, the 
investigative stop of an automobile in response to an anonymous tip 
alleging drunk driving is less invasive of a person’s privacy.  Looking back 
to Terry v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court first crafted the reasonable 
suspicion standard, a major point of concern in allowing the stop and frisk 
of a suspect without an officer first obtaining a search warrant was the 
degree of invasiveness associated with a frisk.216  While the officer will 
always make contact with the suspect when he or she performs a physical 
frisk of a person in attempt to find a concealed weapon, when an officer 
conducts an investigative traffic stop in response to an anonymous tip 
alleging drunk driving, he or she merely has a short conversation with the 
suspect while the suspect remains in his or her car.  There is no physical 
contact made in this context.  Thus, while the investigative traffic stop is 
admittedly a seizure no matter how brief and no matter what the purpose 
is,217 the traffic stop is much less like a search than the physical frisk of a 
person.   
Law enforcement officers are no doubt put through extensive training in 
order to learn to detect signs of intoxication in motorists.  They can use this 
training to minimize the level of invasiveness posed by investigative stops 
based on drunk driving allegations.  By contrast, police officers have no 
means with which to make a hands-on frisk less invasive.  Placing one’s 
hands on another, no matter how limited the search, is quite an invasion of 
that person’s privacy.  Further, it is not only physically invasive—when an 
officer frisks a person, it also has psychological effects on that person, 
including embarrassment, or even a sense of being violated.  This is not the 
case with the investigative traffic stop.  It can be safely assumed that if 
someone had to choose between a hands-on violation by a strange, armed 
cop, and a conversation with that strange, armed cop while sitting in a 
vehicle, ten out of ten people would elect for the conversation. 
The low level of invasiveness posed by an investigative traffic stop 
creates a low threshold for circumstances to meet before a given stop is 
reasonable.  Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances in a given case 
requires a tip to possess lower indicia of reliability prior to a stop based 
upon that tip being reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 216. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968) (noting that the physical frisk of a person 
“must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience”). 
 217. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
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C. The Indicia of Reliability Is Sufficient the Majority of the Time 
Due to the low threshold set by the invasiveness posed by the 
investigative traffic stop, a lower indicia of reliability is required of the 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving than was required of the tip in J.L. in 
order for a given stop to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
Although this is the case, the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving 
possesses relatively high indicia of reliability.  This is because there are 
several factors typically present in the drunk driving situation that, when 
weighed in the totality of the circumstances, are more than sufficient to 
grant reasonable suspicion to the responding officer sufficient to justify a 
given investigative traffic stop based solely on an anonymous tip. 
Some of these factors are always present in the drunk driving situation.  
These factors alone are typically not enough to weigh in favor of a 
reasonable investigative traffic stop.  When other factors are present in a 
given situation, however, the level of reasonableness required by the Fourth 
Amendment is more than met.  To better understand this, a look at each is 
warranted. 
1. Factors Always Present 
Some of the factors that lead to a higher degree of reliability in the drunk 
driving situation are always present.  In other words, by its very nature, the 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is more reliable than the anonymous 
tip alleging the concealed possessory offense.  These factors that are always 
present are:  (a) the fact that anonymous tips are no longer truly 
“anonymous;” and (b) that the crime of erratic driving is a readily 
observable criminal action. 
a) Anonymous Tips Are No Longer “Anonymous” 
Concurring in Florida v. J.L., Justice Kennedy warned of an anonymous 
tipster’s ability to “lie with impunity” in the anonymous tip framework.218  
Courts and commentators alike have used this as one of their strongest 
points when advancing the minority position.219  Even the Eighth Circuit in 
                                                                                                                 
 218. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 219. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 390 (Mass. 1990); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2009) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 880-81 (Vt. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting); 
Michael B. Kunz, “One Free Swerve”?: Requiring Police to Corroborate Anonymous Tips in 
Order to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for Warrantless Seizure of Alleged Drunk Drivers 
86-88 (2010) (unpublished Distinguished Student Research Paper, American University 
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United States v. Wheat admitted that the risk of harassment is a real concern 
with the anonymous tip, although it sided with the majority position 
regarding tips alleging drunk driving.220 
While this seems like a strong point at first blush, a closer look reveals 
that the risk of harassment associated with anonymous tips is overstated.  
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stated that without any means of testing the 
tipster’s credibility, the risk of false accusation becomes unacceptable in the 
anonymous tip framework.221  Yet, the thrust of Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was support for the use of caller identification by 911 systems 
so that if a tip proves false, the tipster may be held accountable for his or 
her actions.222  In other words, caller identification can both limit this risk 
of false accusation, and sometimes provide a means for law enforcement to 
assess the reliability of the tip. 
Today, caller identification has been implemented by 911 systems across 
the country.223  In fact, the Federal Communications Commission rules that 
typically allow a person to block one’s number from caller identification 
services do not allow number blocking for calls placed to emergency 
services lines.224  Thus, when a person calls into systems such as 911, that 
person’s name and/or phone number—even the address if the call is placed 
from a landline—is available to the 911 operator so that emergency 
vehicles can be pointed in the direction of the place of emergency (or the 
false accuser).225   
While this does not account for the nearly seventy percent of all 911 calls 
placed by cellular phones,226 the FCC has implemented rules requiring 
cellular telephone service providers not only to ensure that the cellular 
phones they sell are capable of location services, but also to make it 
possible to trace calls placed to emergency services providers to very 
specific locations.227  The FCC rules require service providers to be able to 
                                                                                                                 
Washington College of Law), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/stu_dis 
tinguished_papers/1/. 
 220. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 221. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 222. See id. at 274-76. 
 223. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET 19: CALLER ID AND MY PRIVACY 3 
(2000), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs19-cid.htm. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See Guide: Wireless 911 Services, FCC.GOV (May 26, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/ 
guides/wireless-911-services). 
 227. See id.; Cell Phones and 9-1-1. NAT’L EMERGENCY NO. ASS’N, http://www.nena. 
org/?page=911Cellphones (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
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pinpoint the location of a caller from a mobile phone when a call is placed 
to 911 so that the operator has this information at hand.228  This is obviously 
so that emergency services vehicles can quickly respond to the caller and 
give assistance as needed.  Just as with calls placed from landlines, though, 
the ability to identify the phone number and location from which a call is 
placed into the 911 system greatly reduces the likelihood of a tipster being 
capable of using law enforcement to harass someone without recourse. 
Due to the widespread use of caller identification by emergency services 
lines,229 the “anonymous informant” is no longer very anonymous.  
Consequently, false accusers typically no longer have the ability to make 
phony allegations without being held accountable by the law.  In fact, 
courts have held that when an informant’s identity is known, and can thus 
be held accountable for false accusations, this mitigates the issue 
surrounding the police officer’s not having a suspicion based on his or her 
own observations.230 
Further, another reason heavily emphasized by courts in the minority 
position is the decreased reliability associated with anonymous 
informants.231  Because the anonymous informant is no longer truly 
anonymous, law enforcement is sometimes provided with a means to test 
the reliability of the tip prior to responding.  For instance, if a person calls 
in from a landline in Norman, Oklahoma, and alleges he or she is watching 
a driver in a specific car swerving all over the interstate in Oklahoma City, 
a responding officer has the means to test the informant’s veracity and basis 
of knowledge.  In this situation, the officer could conclude that not only the 
informant was lying, but also the informant needed to be held accountable 
for his or her actions.  Conversely, if a tip is placed from a cellular 
telephone located on the same interstate where the drunk driver is alleged to 
                                                                                                                 
 228. See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra 
note 227. 
 229. This assumes both Enhanced 911 and Wireless E911 being implemented across the 
country.  See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra 
note 227. 
 230. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“[W]hile the Court’s decisions 
indicate that [the known] informant’s unverified tip may have been insufficient for [an] 
arrest or search warrant, the [uncorroborated] information carried enough indicia of 
reliability to justify the officer’s forcible stop of [the suspect].”) (citations omitted); cf. 
United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 231. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Harris v. 
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Va. 2009) (noting that a bare-boned tip, without 
predictive information, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion). 
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be in Oklahoma City,232 the responding officer is given more reason to 
believe that the tip is legitimate.  Once again, however, if the tip proves to 
be false, the officer has the means to track down the person who owns the 
cellular phone, and can hold him or her accountable for his or her 
wrongdoing. 
Because law enforcement now has a means to hold false accusers 
accountable for their actions, it can be said that this will deter future false 
accusers.  Additionally, as the number of potential false accusers decreases, 
the likelihood that the majority of tips reported are legitimate skyrockets.  
Finally, law enforcement officers can now not only hold false accusers 
accountable, decreasing the likelihood a tip called in is false, but also 
officers can sometimes test the informant’s veracity or basis of knowledge 
prior to responding to a given tip based on the location of the tipster in 
relation to the location of the alleged drunk driver. 
The only caveat to this is that a person could go so far as to place a 
phony anonymous tip from either a payphone or public phone.  If this were 
to occur, the person would have a chance at lying with impunity because it 
would be difficult for law enforcement to find out who placed the 
anonymous call when the caller identification system only listed the 
location of the payphone.  What is more, the officer would not have a 
means to test the reliability of the tip prior to responding.  This small subset 
of anonymous tips would admittedly have to be treated with more 
skepticism.   
b) Erratic Driving Is a Readily Observable Criminal Action 
Another factor that boosts the indicia of reliability possessed by the 
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is that erratic driving is a readily 
observable criminal action.  This is important because if erratic driving is a 
readily observable criminal action, anonymous tips alleging drunk driving 
become much more reliable than a given tip alleging a concealed 
possessory offense, which requires a showing of informant reliability prior 
to giving law enforcement reasonable suspicion.233  The minority position 
has even conceded that if an alleged crime is readily observable, an 
                                                                                                                 
 232. This assumes E911 Phase II has been implemented in the area.  Although it is 
becoming widespread, it will not be available in all areas until the deadline of September 11, 
2012.  See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra note 
227. 
 233. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000). 
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anonymous tip does not have to include predictive information that would 
show a tipster’s insider information.234 
In order to understand what exactly a readily observable criminal action 
entails, a look at the dictionary is warranted.  “Readily” is defined as 
“quickly,” or “without difficulty.”235  Further, “observable” is defined as 
“visible; discernible; noticeable.”236  Putting these two definitions together, 
a readily observable criminal action would be one that is noticeable without 
difficulty, or quickly visible. 
To better understand why erratic driving is readily observable, recall the 
two major Supreme Court cases, supra.  In Alabama v. White, the 
anonymous tip alleged the possession of illegal drugs located in a brown 
briefcase.237  This clearly would not fall into the category of a readily 
observable criminal action.  Prior to the police conducting an investigative 
stop, the only way that an anonymous tipster could have known of the 
woman’s transporting the drugs was if that tipster possessed insider 
information.  Therefore, in objectively looking at an anonymous tip alleging 
the concealed transport of drugs, the risk of the tip being unreliable, 
whether because it was fabricated in order to harass the woman or 
otherwise, was very high.  This is why the Court stated that something more 
than a bare-bones tip alleging the illegal possession of drugs located in a 
briefcase was required—a showing of reliability that indicated the 
anonymous informant possessed inside information.238   
Similarly, in J.L., the crime alleged was the illegal possession of a 
firearm.239  In objectively looking at an anonymous tip alleging the 
possession of a concealed firearm, this also would not fall into the category 
of a readily observable criminal action.  Unless the accused inadvertently 
showed his gun to a bystander, the only way an anonymous tipster could 
have known of the concealed weapon was if that tipster possessed insider 
information pertaining to the accused’s illegally possessing the concealed 
firearm.   
While it is possible that the young man in J.L. did accidentally expose 
his gun to a bystander, the anonymous informant did not relay this fact 
                                                                                                                 
 234. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146 (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595, 
603 (Va. 2004)). 
 235. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1500 (2d ed. 1983). 
 236. Id. at 1235. 
 237. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). 
 238. See id. at 332. 
 239. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). 
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when he called the police and made the allegations.240  Further, the 
responding officers testified that the suspect made no movements out of the 
ordinary upon their arrival, nor gave them reason for suspicion in any other 
way.241  Because the informant did not state that he had observed the 
suspect expose his weapon, and the responding officers testified the way 
that they did, it explains why the Court reasoned that the informant had to 
have possessed insider information regarding the concealed possessory 
offense.  This, in turn, explains why, as in White, the Supreme Court in J.L. 
stated that such a tip would have to include a showing of insider 
information prior to giving rise to reasonable suspicion.242 
Comparing both the illegal possession of drugs hidden in a plain, 
commonly-used briefcase, and the illegal possession of a gun hidden under 
a person’s clothes with the crime of erratic driving, there is a clear 
difference.  In drunk driving cases, tipsters are seeing people driving on the 
wrong side of the road,243 cutting other cars off,244 stumbling out of bars 
prior to getting behind the wheel,245 and almost causing head-on collisions 
or hitting guardrails.246  The things anonymous tipsters are seeing in these 
cases are readily observable to anyone in the accused’s vicinity. Noticing 
things that are visible without difficulty to anyone that is sharing the road 
with the alleged drunk driver does not require the insider knowledge that it 
would take for a person to know that John Doe is carrying illegal drugs in 
his briefcase, or that he is carrying a firearm concealed beneath his clothes.   
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 268. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 272. 
 243. See Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000) 
(tipping that “a pickup truck with Massachusetts license plate number D34-314 was 
traveling on the wrong side of Route 195 in the vicinity of Route 140 in New Bedford”). 
 244. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2001). (tipping that “[a] tan-
and cream-colored Nissan Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was 
being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169 . . . .” and complaining “that 
the Nissan was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise 
being driven as if by a ‘complete maniac.’”); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1073 
(Wyo. 1999) (tipping that “a red Mercury with temporary plates was weaving between lanes, 
passing cars, and slowing down in order to pass them again”). 
 245. See State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84 (S.D. 2004) (“The informant gave the 
license plate number of the vehicle . . . described the vehicle as a blue Toyota Tacoma 
pickup” and that the informant had seen the driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling 
pretty badly”). 
 246. See State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004) (stating that the 
informant “reported that the [alleged drunk driver] had almost caused several head-on 
collisions and had almost hit a guardrail”). 
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The minority would no doubt argue that regardless of a person’s driving 
erratically, it does not mean he or she is drunk.  While driving erratically 
and driving drunk are not mutually dependent upon each other, whether a 
person is drunk or otherwise, a vehicle’s being operated erratically still 
legally justifies an officer to stop the vehicle.247  Accordingly, the fact that 
erratic driving—whether caused by alcohol-impairment or not—is a readily 
observable criminal action, boosts the reliability of the tip alleging such 
driving.  
2. Factors That, When Present, Weigh in Favor of Allowing These Stops 
Though the factors above will most always be present in the drunk 
driving situation, those factors alone are typically not enough to justify 
investigative stops under the Fourth Amendment.  Other “elevating 
circumstances” are required by the White/J.L. rule for dealing with 
anonymous tips and reasonable suspicion.  These “elevating circumstances” 
include:  (a) when a tip includes enough information so that it can be 
reasonably concluded the tip comes from a firsthand observer; and (b) when 
a tip provides enough descriptive information so that the accused can be 
found by a responding officer in a very short amount of time. 
a) When Tips Come from Firsthand Observations 
When a tip alleging drunk driving comes from contemporaneous, 
firsthand observations, it further increases the tip’s indicia of reliability.  
Whether the tip is from another motorist sharing the road with the alleged 
drunk driver calling in from his or her cellular telephone,248 a person seeing 
someone stumble out of a bar and get in a car to leave,249 or a worker at a 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See, e.g., England v. State, 560 P.2d 216, 218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (“In a 
number of cases, this Court has approved the stopping by officers of motorists whose 
method of driving convinced the officers that the manner in which the vehicle was being 
driven made it a menace to the traveling public.”); Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358, 360 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1957). 
 248. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724 (tipping that “[a] tan-and cream-colored Nissan 
Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was being driven erratically in 
the northbound lane of Highway 169” and complaining “that the Nissan was passing on the 
wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a 
‘complete maniac’”); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 625 (Iowa 2001) (“The call was 
apparently made on a cellular phone because the caller was following the subject car.”); 
Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290 (involving “an unidentified motorist,” which reported that a 
truck was driving erratically on the highway). 
 249. See Scholl, 684 N.W.2d at 84 (tipping by anonymous informant that he had seen the 
driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling pretty badly” prior to getting behind the 
wheel and driving off). 
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fast food chain seeing a person in the drive-thru line barely being able to 
hold his or her head up while behind the wheel,250 when informants simply 
report things they are contemporaneously viewing while in the accused’s 
vicinity, the assertion of illegality in the tip is much more likely legitimate.  
As the Eighth Circuit noted,251 when an informant is also a firsthand 
observer, the degree to which the reliability of the tip’s allegations of 
criminal activity increases, which means the amount of information 
required to provide law enforcement with reasonable suspicion decreases 
under the totality of the circumstances. 
This does not mean that any tip alleging drunk driving will be the 
product of contemporaneous observation, thus requiring less information to 
give rise to reasonable suspicion.  Instead, there is a threshold that 
informants must meet when they make allegations in order to ensure law 
enforcement that the informant has “firsthand observer status.”  For 
instance, a tip that only states, “a red Nissan Maxima is driving northbound 
on I-35, and the driver is drunk” would not meet this threshold.  This sort of 
tip does not give enough information regarding the tipster’s observations, 
and it is thus just as likely that the tip is false as it is that the tip is 
legitimate.252   
A tip that would meet this threshold would look more like this: “A red 
Nissan Maxima with the license plate of G-K-U-3-6-5, driving northbound 
on I-35, which just passed the Indian Hills Road exit, is being operated by a 
drunk driver.  I know the driver is drunk because I watched him drink eight 
beers in the last hour at O’Connell’s Pub and stumble out to his car to get 
behind the wheel.  Further I followed him and have seen him swerve 
several times, almost causing several accidents.”  In a tip like this, not only 
is the informant claiming firsthand knowledge, but also the informant is 
making much more specific allegations regarding the accused’s criminal 
conduct. 
The bulk of majority jurisdictions have considered tips that look more 
like the latter example in determining whether these tips give rise to 
                                                                                                                 
 250. See People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (dealing with “an 
employee of Wendy’s restaurant, [who] had called regarding a person who ‘was causing a 
disturbance and was intoxicated’ while ordering food at the restaurant’s drive-thru”); State v. 
Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 639 (N.D. 1994) (involving a Wendy’s employee, who called to 
report that a specific car in the drive-thru line was being driven by someone who “could 
barely hold his head up”). 
 251. See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734. 
 252. Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).  The tip in the example is very similar 
to the tip in J.L., which the Court stated was not sufficient to grant reasonable suspicion to 
the responding officer.  Id. at 272. 
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reasonable suspicion.253  Such tips meet the threshold indicating they are 
coming from firsthand observers.  Also, remember that law enforcement 
has the means to both test the tipsters’ veracity and hold them accountable 
if the tips prove to be false via reverse-911 systems.254  This is in stark 
contrast to the situation in J.L., where nothing was known about the 
anonymous tipster who called the police255 and the allegation was merely 
conclusory—“the accused is illegally in possession of a gun.”256  In not 
knowing a single thing about the informant—whether he or she had 
observed the young man accidentally exposing his concealed weapon while 
in public or was merely placing the call to harass or otherwise get the young 
man into trouble with the law—the likelihood that the conclusory allegation 
of illegality in the tip was true was not very high.  Thus, the allegation in 
the anonymous tip in J.L. did not justify the investigative stop and frisk that 
the police conducted. 
The minority position would argue that the tip seen in J.L. could, in fact, 
have come from a firsthand observer.  There is no doubt that this is a 
possibility.  Despite this, in looking at anonymous tips, what is in the realm 
of possibilities is not the same as what is known to be true when applying a 
totality of the circumstances test to determine if reasonable suspicion 
existed prior to the stop.  If there would have been something known about 
the anonymous informant in J.L., such as the informant contemporaneously 
observing the accused carrying a gun where it was visible to anyone in the 
accused’s vicinity, the tip would have become more reliable.  But this was 
not the case.257  Because of this, the Court stated that something more was 
required than a bare-bones tip, or in other words, something that would help 
show the tip’s reliability.258 
b) When Tips Point Law Enforcement to the Accused Quickly 
Another factor that, when present, increases the tip’s reliability is when 
the tipster is able to place the alleged drunk driver in a specific location 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724; Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Del. 
2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 
625-26; State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 361 (N.J. 2003); Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84; Boyea, 
765 A.2d at 863 ; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 519. 
 254. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 255. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See id. 
 258. Id. at 274. 
2012] COMMENT 801 
 
 
where police can easily locate the driver.259  This may not be predictive in 
the sense that the informant does not usually allege a final destination 
where the drunk driver is travelling, as appeared to be the tipping point in 
White when the Supreme Court allowed the investigative stop based upon 
an anonymous tip alleging the illegal possession of drugs.260  Nevertheless, 
as the Supreme Court of Delaware noted in Bloomingdale v. State, if an 
informant can place the vehicle in a location where the responding officer 
can quickly locate it, the probability that the informant’s allegation of drunk 
driving being true increases.261  This is because it would be very difficult to 
fabricate a tip against a person in a car, which has the capability of 
travelling at high speeds and readily changing directions, so that a 
responding officer could easily be able to locate the alleged drunk driver. 
If the purpose of a fabricated anonymous tip were to have the police 
harass the accused, then it would be fairly easy to succeed in placing such a 
tip against a person on foot who remains in a set location for a meaningful 
amount of time, as was the case in J.L.262  It would not be remotely difficult 
to know where a person one dislikes is hanging out and place a false tip 
alleging that the person is committing any number of crimes at that 
location.  Placing such a tip alleging drunk driving is a much more difficult 
proposition.  In the drunk driving context, the accused is behind the wheel 
of a vehicle, which is capable of disappearing in an instant.263  If a tipster 
can point the otherwise-clueless responding officer to the accused in a short 
amount of time, the tipster almost certainly has to possess some sort of 
firsthand knowledge regarding the driver.  Firsthand knowledge, in turn, 
increases the likelihood that the allegations of illegality in the tip are 
legitimate, as seen supra.264 
The minority would certainly argue that there is no real showing of 
reliability with regard to the assertion of illegality in an anonymous tip, 
                                                                                                                 
 259. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 117 (Kan. 2003) (locating and conducting 
the investigative stop six minutes after receiving the report of the anonymous tip); State v. 
Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84 (S.D. 2004) (observing the car described in the report and 
conducting an investigative stop three to four minutes after responding to the report of the 
alleged drunk driver); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 863 (Vt. 2000) (locating the alleged 
drunk driver within five minutes).  
 260. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990). 
 261. See Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Del. 2004). 
 262. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268. 
 263. See Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1220; cf. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93 
(1985) (explaining why a vehicle is excepted from traditional warrant requirements); 68 AM. 
JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 192. 
 264. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
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even when a tip can place a vehicle where a responding officer can easily 
locate it.  While this may be true in isolation, when an informant, who is no 
longer truly anonymous and can be held accountable for his or her actions, 
witnesses first-hand a readily observable criminal action, such as erratic 
driving, and simply calls in a report of what he or she is seeing, and the 
responding officer can quickly find the described vehicle in the location it is 
alleged to be, the likelihood that a tip is accurate, not only in its ability to 
identify the vehicle and driver (the innocent details), but also in its assertion 
of illegality (the fact that a person is driving erratically) increases 
dramatically. 
Due to the low level of invasiveness posed by the investigative traffic 
stop, the high indicia of reliability possessed by the anonymous tip alleging 
drunk driving renders the majority of investigative traffic stops in response 
to anonymous tips alleging drunk driving reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Furthermore, as consistently announced by the Court, there is 
a legitimate State interest in ridding public roads of drunk drivers.265  Thus, 
although the majority position’s reasoning is flawed, the bulk of the tips are 
constitutional.266 
If all of these factors do not come together in a given situation, however, 
the investigative stop based solely upon an anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving is on much shakier footing.  While close cases may be such that the 
investigative stop can be constitutionally upheld due to social policy,267 
other cases will come out in favor of disallowing such stops—that is the 
nature of a totality of the circumstances test.  A continuum is thus created—
the majority of investigative stops, even without prior independent police 
corroboration, are reasonable; some stops, which occur in situations that do 
not contain all of the above-mentioned factors are unreasonable; and 
finally, stops that occur in situations that are “close calls” can be upheld as 
reasonable due to social policy forwarded by the Court. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 265. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one can 
seriously dispute . . . the State’s interest in eradicating [drunk driving.”]); Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (“States surely have [an] interest in removing drunken 
drivers from their highways . . . .”). 
 266. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d. at 1213; Prendergast, 
83 P.3d at 715-16; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 625-26; Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290; Miller, 
510 N.W.2d at 639; Golotta, 837 A.2d at 361; Scholl, 684 N.W.2d at 84; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 
863; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 519; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1072. 
 267. See infra Part IV.D. 
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D. Stops That Fall in the Middle of the Continuum Should Be Upheld Due 
to Social Policy  
As demonstrated supra, the typical tip alleging drunk driving contains 
factors that give a boost in reliability, helping to give rise to reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop based solely on such a 
tip.  But not all tips alleging drunk driving contain all of the discussed 
factors.  This can make a given situation a much closer call.  Despite this, 
the social policy against drunk driving that has been forwarded by the Court 
in several decisions helps to tip the scale in the “close call” situation in 
favor of a given investigative stop being constitutionally justifiable. 
The Court has consistently upheld questionable state laws in the face of 
conflicting individual rights when drunk driving has been at issue.268  This 
has ranged from allowing implied consent laws,269 where the State reserves 
the right to summarily suspend a drunk driver’s license without affording 
the drunk driver any meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the 
deprivation, to allowing sobriety checkpoint stops, which grant the police 
the power to stop a vehicle without any individualized suspicion.270  The 
only reasonable explanation for this controversial line of cases is that the 
Court was allowing the policy in favor of ridding public roads of drunk 
drivers to outweigh other concerns. 
Policy is certainly not controlling.  It is, however, persuasive in cases 
that could go either way.  Thus, even though a given situation does not 
include all of the previously discussed reliability factors, when a situation 
falls in the middle of the anonymous tip continuum, a court considering an 
investigative stop based solely upon an anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving can and should uphold the stop due to social policy. 
V. Conclusion 
Whether an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving provides a responding 
officer with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative traffic 
stop under the Fourth Amendment, absent prior independent corroboration 
by the officer of the criminal allegations made in the tip, is a highly divisive 
                                                                                                                 
 268. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447 (upholding sobriety checkpoint stop in the face of the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554, 564 
(1983) (upholding an implied consent law in the face of the Fifth Amendment); Montrym, 
443 U.S. at 3-4, 19 (upholding an implied consent law in the face of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 269. See South Neville, 459 U.S. at 554; Montrym, 443 U.S. at 3. 
 270. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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issue.  While the majority of courts that have considered the issue have held 
that the anonymous tip alone is sufficient to justify such stops, the minority 
position is that absent independent police corroboration, an anonymous tip, 
by itself, is not enough to justify an investigative traffic stop under the 
Fourth Amendment.   
Although incorrect in couching its holding in dicta, the majority position 
is correct in that the bulk of investigative stops based solely upon 
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The low level of invasiveness posed by the investigative 
traffic stop in response to the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving sets a 
low threshold in terms of indicia of reliability required of an anonymous tip 
under the totality of the circumstances test.  The anonymous tip alleging 
drunk driving typically possesses relatively high indicia of reliability 
because of several factors.  Some factors are always present in the situation:  
(1) anonymous tips are no longer truly “anonymous;” and (2) erratic driving 
is a readily observable criminal action.  While these factors alone will 
usually not be enough, when other factors are present in a given situation, 
the investigative stop in response to an anonymous tip alleging drunk 
driving will typically be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even 
without prior independent corroboration.  These factors include:  (1) when a 
tip comes from a firsthand observer; and (2) when a tip points an otherwise 
clueless responding officer to the accused in a short amount of time.   
Admittedly, not all investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips 
alleging drunk driving are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.  
When all of these factors come together in a given situation, however, the 
low threshold required by the invasiveness of the investigative traffic stop 
is more than met.  This, combined with the governmental interest in ridding 
roads of drunk drivers, makes the bulk of investigative traffic stops based 
solely on anonymous tips alleging drunk driving reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.  Because of this, the majority of the time, the alleged 
drunk driver should not be granted “one free swerve” prior to police being 
able to pull the accused over for a quick check. 
 
James Michael Scears 
 
 
